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Abstract: This paper is devoted to the growing 
phenomenon of the private military and securi-
ty industry with respect to human rights obliga-
tions. In the first part, it will analyze the concept 
of a private security company, which is not clear 
in national regulations and has few relevant pro-
visions in international conventions. The second 
part will contain a short description of examples 
of human rights violations committed by private 
military and security companies, or with their par-
ticipation, during service delivery or other forms of 
activity. The third part of this paper discusses pos-
sible methods of responsibility enforcement, with 
respect to the transnational character of many pri-
vate security companies involved in human rights 
violations worldwide. One of the most important 
elements of the discussion in international com-
munity should focus on binding international in-
strument, preferably a convention, which would 
be able to establish at least very elementary rules 
for states and international organizations, respon-
sible for using private military and security compa-
nies. The international community has witnessed 
a lot of initiatives from non-governmental entities, 
also model laws and self-regulations of the private 
security industry, but still the real problem has not 
even been reduced. The number of human rights 
violations has grown.
Keywords: Human rights. Private security com-
panies. Liability.
Resumo: Este artigo trata do crescente fenômeno 
da indústria militar e de segurança privada no que 
diz respeito às obrigações com direitos humanos. 
Na primeira parte, analisará o conceito de empresa 
de segurança privada, o que não está claro nas regu-
lamentações nacionais e tem poucas disposições re-
levantes nas convenções internacionais. A segunda 
parte contém uma breve descrição de exemplos de 
violações de direitos humanos cometidas por em-
presas militares e de segurança privadas. A terceira 
parte discute possíveis métodos de responsabiliza-
ção, com respeito ao caráter transnacional de mui-
tas empresas privadas de segurança envolvidas em 
violações de direitos humanos em todo o mundo. 
Um dos elementos mais importantes da discussão 
na comunidade internacional deve se concentrar 
na criação de instrumentos internacionais vincu-
lantes, preferencialmente uma convenção, que po-
deria estabelecer regras pelo menos muito elemen-
tares para estados e organizações internacionais, 
de modo a responsabilizar o uso de empresas mi-
litares e de segurança privadas. A comunidade in-
ternacional tem testemunhado muitas iniciativas 
de entidades não-governamentais, há também leis 
modelo e auto-regulação da indústria de segurança 
privada, mas o problema nem sequer foi reduzido. 
O número de violações de direitos humanos nesses 
casos tem aumentado.
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Introduction
Over the last twenty years private military and security companies have become a grow-
ing phenomenon. Not only individuals but also legal entities, such as states and international or-
ganizations, rely on the private sector in security matters. The issue of security, still stays in the 
hands of states, which are obliged to provide and ensure public security, the same as protection to 
individuals when necessary. In practice, multiple examples show that, even if public authorities do 
their best efforts in delivering safety and security, the result is still not satisfactory. That is why 
the market of security services belongs to the most interesting and dynamic, and consequently is 
growing rapidly. Economic demand stimulates supply, and both have created an industry of trans-
national character. 
This paper is devoted to the growing phenomenon of the private military and security 
industry with respect to human rights obligations. In the first part it will analyze the concept of a 
private security company, which is not clear in national regulations and has few relevant provisions 
in international conventions. Despite the existing legal gap in international law, humanitarian law 
and human rights law, the theory of international law faces an urgent need to provide at least some 
analysis on legal concepts and the possible application of international law provisions to private 
security companies.
The second part will contain a short description of examples of human rights violations 
committed by private military and security companies, or with their participation, during service 
delivery or other forms of activity. With regard to this concept, human rights violations will be ana-
lyzed not only as violations committed by private sector but also as violations committed by states 
obliged to punish violations committed by other entities, including legal bodies. Unfortunately, in 
practice states have serious problems enforcing this responsibility.
The third part of this paper discusses possible methods of responsibility enforcement, 
with respect to the transnational character of many private security companies involved in hu-
man rights violations worldwide. This leads to enforce criminal responsibility to those who violate 
human rights and commit crimes, and international responsibility of the state, which contracts 
private security companies. Conclusions will be based on possible proposals on how to deal with 
the phenomenon of private security companies and how human rights law could be better enforced 
both by states and private entities.
1 The concept of private military and security company
The growing market of private military and security companies has been analyzed from 
many aspects and points of view, including economic, geographical, political and legal. Legal descrip-
tion is specific, since it requires a distinction between international and national considerations, as 
the most recognisable private security companies operate worldwide, and participate in many armed 
conflicts. Unfortunately, existing international law of armed conflicts, both international and non-in-
755
Human rights violations committed...
Joaçaba, v. 17, n. 3, p. 753-766, set./dez. 2016EJJL
ternational, has been created by states and for states. Consequently, that aspect did not take into 
consideration the fact that private entities, would appear in international community, and later join 
such a large number of armed conflicts, independently on what they do – logistics or other types of 
support to armed forces. That is why the status of private military and security companies is not clear 
in international humanitarian law, as well as in international law as a whole (White, 2012, pp. 11-30).
With regard to this phenomenon we have to rely on national law regulations, which 
define requirements on private security companies and their conduct. In most cases this type of 
company is defined by the type of services delivered in the market. Such services are focused on 
the protection of persons and their property. Detailed analysis must distinguish “private security 
company” from “private military company” (Diphorn, 2009, p. 100). The latter is associated with 
military services and direct participation in the conduct of hostilities. Of course in practice it is 
difficult to differentiate those two categories, since private security companies also operate in con-
flict zones and undertake activity which is directly connected with the use of force. In conclusion, 
practice of service delivery and activity may be very different from the registration of the company 
(Voyame, 2007, pp. 361-376). A helpful explanation is provided by Questions and answers on the 
Montreux Document: 
There is no standard definition of what is a ‘military’ company and what is ‘se-
curity’ company. In ordinary parlance, certain activities (such as participating in 
combat) are traditionally understood to be military in nature and others (such 
as guarding residences) related to security. In reality many companies provide a 
wide range of services, which can go from typically military services to typical-
ly security services. They are therefore not easily categorized. Moreover, from 
the humanitarian point of view, the relevant question is not how a company 
is labeled but what specific services it provides in a particular instance. For this 
reason, the Montreux Document avoids any strict delimitation between private 
military and private security companies and uses the inclusive term ‘private mil-
itary and security companies’ (PMSCs) to encompass all companies that provide 
either military or security services or both (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 
& International Committee of the Red Cross, 2008, pp. 7-27, 38-42).
Despite the shortage of international legal definition of the concept, especially in inter-
national humanitarian law, we can rely on national regulations, but unfortunately there is one 
exception. Usually states confirm only the fact that they have private security companies while 
reject, that they employ private military companies, or even that such companies exist or operate 
under their jurisdiction. With respect to that way of thinking, it seems to be logical to use the term 
“private military and security company”.
From the legal point of view we are talking about a legal person or legal entity operating 
during an armed conflict or at least in conflict situations and zones. We talk about the legal obli-
gations of the company but also about obligations of the personnel (Weigelt, & Märker, 2007, pp. 
377-394). With respect to this question the status of personnel should be analyzed in a different way 
in times of war, during which 
. . . all individuals have to respect international humanitarian law in any activity 
related to an armed conflict. PMSC personnel are no exception. If they commit se-
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rious violations of humanitarian law, such as attacks against civilians or ill-treat-
ment of detainees, these are war crimes that must be prosecuted by States. While 
companies such as have no obligations under international law, their employees 
do. On the other hand, international humanitarian law and human rights law 
also protect the personnel of these companies. The protection they are entitled 
to will vary depending on the type of activity they engage in. For instance, most 
PMSC employees are deployed as civilians in situations of armed conflict; in this 
case, they are protected against attack, unless and for such time as they directly 
participate in hostilities (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, & International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 2008, p. 39).  
In the literature of international law there is a growing number of analysis of private 
security companies which focus on them from the perspective of privatization of war.1 The legal 
definition meets the requirements of mercenaries, but they can be applied only to some extent. 
However, those criteria require a more detailed description. Despite legal difficulties the Montreux 
Document proposes the most widely recognized definition which is applicable for the purpose of 
this Document and clarifies that 
PMSCs are private entities that provide military and/or security services, irre-
spective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include, 
in particular, armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as con-
voys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons sys-
tems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security 
personnel (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, & International Committee of 
the Red Cross, 2008, para. 9(a)).2 
Unfortunately, this definition was adopted for the purpose of the Montreux Document, 
which is not an internationally binding instrument (Ralby, 2016, pp. 235-264), and can be applied 
only for international humanitarian law interpretation and does not create new obligations. It is 
also worth mentioning that it “. . . does not refer to direct participation in hostilities or to offensive 
or defensive services” (Jerby, 2013, p. 5). 
“Private security service provider” is another term which was introduced by the Inter-
national Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and defines the concept as “. . . 
any Company (as defined in this Code) whose business activities include the provision of Security 
Services either on its own behalf or on behalf of another, irrespective of how such a Company de-
scribes itself ” (Jerby, 2013, p. 50). The author pays special attention that despite the term military 
was removed from the Code because the Association does not want to be connected with military 
functions, it is applicable to signatory companies which provide military services and signed this 
document (Jerby, 2013, p. 50).
Latin America is specially affected by the phenomenon of private security companies. Due 
to armed conflicts, difficult political situations and personal danger, individuals rely on private secu-
rity companies as those entities may bring at least some protection. In some Latin American states 
1  See, for example, Cameron and Chetail (2013), Drews (2007, p. 331-344), Huskey (2012, p. 193-212), Karska and Karski 
(2014, p. 397-491), Schaller (2007, p. 345-360), and Tonkin (2011).
2  See Seiberth (2014, p. 67).
757
Human rights violations committed...
Joaçaba, v. 17, n. 3, p. 753-766, set./dez. 2016EJJL
officials of high authority have to hire private security companies. Such companies are allowed to 
possess guns which are needed in effective delivery of their services. But this issue requires specific 
clarification on the type of weapons allowed, and the specific regulations for monitoring the situ-
ation. In the process of delivering security violations take place. Access to guns and firearms is not 
limited to civilians and individual persons, with very imprecise rules of applying for licenses. The 
easy purchase and legal possession of arms, without strict requirements, seem to be the main source 
of the unprecedented development of private security companies, with increasing legal problems 
seemingly arising as a consequence of their activity. 
One such example is Honduras, which was examined by the UN Working Group on the 
use of mercenaries twice in 2006 and 2013. Findings were very interesting:
Security has become a commodity in high demand in Honduras and has led to 
the exponential growth of the private security sector. Today PSCs dominate and 
control the security sector in Honduras. According to Ministry of Security, there 
are 706 registered PSCs and 14,878 private security guards known to work for 
these companies in Honduras. This figure is already grater than the estimated 
number of police officers in the country, which is 14,000 at most. In addition 
to the registered PSCs and their guards, there are reportedly tens of thousands 
of unregistered and illegal security guards. According to the National Police, the 
number of such private security guards is estimated at 60,000. This makes the 
ratio of private security personnel to police almost 5 to 1, rendering the authority 
of the police force minuscule compared to the power and the facto authority 
of PSCs. Furthermore, many of the PSCs are reportedly owned by or have close 
connections with former high-ranking military or police officers, or even active 
officers in some cases, although the National Police and the Ministry of Defence 
maintain that no active officers own or work for PMSCs. To that extent, the 
PSCs in Honduras are undoubtedly powerful entities with significant leverage 
and there are significant challenges in ensuring that their activities are kept wi-
thin the four corners of the law (United Nation of Human Rights, 2013, pp. 6-7).
To conclude on the concept and industry of private military and security companies we 
have to look at the level of violence and individual crimes committed in the specific region. That 
is usually the main reason for justifying access to individual security. The second aspect refers to 
the right to posses different types of weapons and with respect to this, in every country access 
to guns and firearms should be limited to licensed private security companies, and the same basic 
limitations should be provided to individuals. Only under this condition and enforcement of public 
security, human rights may be properly protected and have a chance to be improved.
2 Examples of human rights violations committed by private military and security 
companies
A private security company acts both during the time of war (armed conflict) and during 
the time of peace (Gómez del Prado, 2011, pp. 151-169). Consequences of human rights violations 
need to be distinguished in those two categories and extended into serious violations of internatio-
nal humanitarian law which may constitute war crimes. In fact, this last category together with 
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crimes against humanity belong to the most frequently committed by the personnel of private mi-
litary and security companies. In the literature of international law authors pay special attention to 
violations of women’s rights and rights of a child. Vrdoljak (2011) wrote: 
Recent press coverage of the role of private military and security companies in 
conflict and post-conflict operations has invariably involved women. Women have 
been PMSC employees and brought actions against their employers for sexual as-
sault or have been civilian victims of private contractors operating forced prosti-
tution rings. Armed conflict, belligerent occupation, and civil strife are by defini-
tion necessarily violent for all participants, be they civilians, combatants, or PMSC 
employees. However, for women it heralds an exacerbation in existing violence, 
discrimination, and inequalities. The increasing engagement of PMSC’s in conflict, 
post-conflict, and transition situations in the provision of security and other servi-
ces has brought their activities and operations starkly to the fore – particularly as 
they relate to women specifically and gender-related issues more generally (p. 280).
 Further analysis indicates that 
. . . there are corollary statistics for injuries not occasioning death. In addition, the 
likelihood of extrajudicial killings rises exponentially for women during armed 
conflict. In conflicts in Mexico and Guatemala, evidence has emerged of women 
being deliberately targeted because of their gender (femicide). These trends can 
be extrapolated for private contractors, for instance, a survey in Israel indicated a 
link between incidents of domestic violence and homicide and firearms licensed 
to private security guards (Vrdoljak, 2011, p. 282).
The author also discusses special aspect of sexual violence and private military and securi-
ty companies’ role employees in commission of this type of crime. In her opinion: 
Sexual violence encompasses various acts including forced prostitution, sex traf-
ficking, forced sterilization, forced abortions, forced impregnation, and pregnan-
cies and so forth. Data has highlighted that PMSC employees are as likely to 
perpetrate such crimes as are regular armed forces. It is unsurprising given that, 
as noted above, PMSC recruits are often drawn from regular armed forces. For 
example, DynCorp Aerospace Technology UK Ltd employees were implicated in 
sex slavery in Bosnia by Human Rights Watch before a US congressional hearing 
in 2002. A subsequent US Department of Defence (DoD) Inspector General re-
port found the situation was fuelled by the lack of any requirement for private 
contractors to report or punish employees engaged in such conduct (Vrdoljak, 
2011, pp. 283-284).
Similar problems arise with respect to the rights of a child. Baker and Greijer (2011) wrote 
about several incidents that 
. . . have been reported in the press or by human rights organizations of children 
becoming victims of violence or abuse PMSC employees. In most cases, these 
incidents have not been investigated and no prosecutions have been launched 
against those responsible. In Colombia, children have been victims of sexual 
abuse by PMSC agents. According to a press report, in October 2004 employees 
of a US PMSC, together with US marines, committed acts of sexual violence 
against three minors and widely distributed videos of the abuse among the local 
population. The marines and private contractors worked as advisors to Colom-
bian military personnel on the Tolemaida Air Base, near the town of Melgar. No 
investigations or prosecutions have been launched, since US military personnel 
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and private contractors benefit from an immunity agreement between the Uni-
ted States and Colombia. Concerning Guatemala, there have been reports that: 
non-state actors with links to organized crime, gangs, private security companies, 
and alleged ‘clandestine groups’ committed hundreds of killings and other cri-
mes. However, no details were provided on the specific involvement of PMSCs. 
Children were also among the victims of the Nisour Square incident in Iraq, in 
which 17 civilians were killed and 20 others injured by employees of the PMSC 
Blackwater International in September 2007. At least one of the persons killed 
was a child (an 11-year-old boy) and several children were injured after a grenade 
was thrown into a nearby school. Although five of these employees were indicted 
by the District of Columbia in December 2008, the charges were dismissed on 31 
December 2009, based on violation of the rights of the defendants (p. 265).3
Bakker and Greijer (2011) highlight that: 
Due to the absence of incompleteness of investigations in these incidents, very 
scarce information is available, including about the names of the PMSCs and the 
nationality of the employees who were allegedly involved. Therefore, the ques-
tion whether they benefited from any immunity agreement cannot be answered, 
except in the Colombian example, where there was indeed the case. Nevertheless, 
despite the lack of details, this overview shows that reports do exist about the 
violations of children rights by PMSC personnel, which confirms the risk of such 
violations through the employment of PMSCs, as well as the need to prevent 
them (pp. 265-266).
Within the category of human rights violations reports highlight the right to life. Specific 
situations constitute violations of certain categories of people and peoples not only the highlighted 
rights of children, but the right of people to self-determination. This right has been examined by 
many international institutions, including the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council, 
with respect to the activity of mercenaries. Due to the problem of private military and security 
companies replacing mercenaries, further analysis focuses on the use of private military and security 
companies in impeding the right of peoples to self-determination. This shift in focus has a historical 
background and 
. . . a new role for mercenaries evolved in the context of decolonization in the 
1960s, when they were hired to fight against national liberation movements 
and prevent the exercise of the right to self-determination of peoples under co-
lonial domination. They were also used in the period following independence 
to destabilize newly independent governments, often fighting alongside armed 
opposition groups who were cultivated as aliens. These practices were considered 
unacceptable and widely condemned by United Nations organs (United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2002, p. 5).
We also have to remember human rights obligations and the basis of them: the right to 
protection. That aspect is connected with obligations of states which should punish violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law committed by private military and security com-
panies. If they do not punish them, due to the lack of will or lack of ability, state authorities violate 
3  See Snukal (2015, p. 660-675), and Johnston, and Broder (2007).
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a basic obligation: to protect human rights, which consequently increases the level of impunity of 
such companies and their personnel. 
With respect to categories of potential human rights violations committed by private mi-
litary and security companies, or with their participation, legal analysis should include specific cate-
gories of international humanitarian law and international criminal law provisions. Since in practice 
private security companies often operate in armed conflict zones, their activity may constitute serious 
violations of international humanitarian law as defined by Geneva Conventions on the protection of 
victims of war, adopted on 12 August 1949. Article 50 of the I Geneva Convention states: 
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any 
of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the 
Convention: willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological 
experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, 
and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly (International Committee of 
the Red Cross, 1949).
This provision has consequences in international criminal law regulations.
Detailed analysis of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute (Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, 1998) indicates that private military and security companies may be 
involved in a commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. That statement of course 
does not exclude potential participation in a commission of the crime of genocide or even in a com-
mission of the crime of aggression, but until today such an example is yet to be reported. Neverthe-
less, one of the most important cases of human rights violations, committed with the participation 
of a private security company refers to the accident on the Nisour Square in Bagdad in September 
2007, and has had serious criminal repercussions for Blackwater personnel.
3 Possible ways of responsibility enforcement
Violations of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law appli-
cable in armed conflicts that constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity may be committed by 
the personnel of private military and security companies in the same way as by regular armed forces. 
It is important to consider that human rights, human rights violations committed by the personnel 
of private security companies are very difficult to investigate. Analysis of such violations in the first 
aspect need to distinguish possible ways of justice enforcement and secondly, create a specific field 
of self-regulation of the industry based on soft-law mechanisms, which still require modifications. 
Human rights violations primarily should be investigated by the court of justice in the country where 
crime was committed. Unfortunately, in this case we may face a crucial problem which is connected 
with so called impunity agreements. On the basis of such agreements, personnel of private military 
and security companies may be excluded from the national jurisdiction of a state in which they oper-
ate. On the other hand, prosecution in such cases should be undertaken by national courts of the state 
in which the company is registered. That poses a practical problem of accessing the site to collect any 
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evidence. This situation is also difficult for national prosecutors due to limited time and the reliance 
on evidence collected by judicial authorities and police in place of the crime commission. This aspect 
of national criminal justice is not easy in international cooperation (Karska, 2013).
Another path which may be taken in respect to the commission of serious violations 
of international humanitarian law is international jurisdiction enforced by international criminal 
tribunals and courts. Of course in this case, we also face a lot of problems with justice enforce-
ment. One of them refers to the lack of recognition of the ICC jurisdiction by the biggest powers 
and majority of permanent members of the Security Council (inter alia: United States and Russia), 
which are not concerned with ratifying this Statute. Most private security companies operating in 
present international conflicts are registered in the United States and Great Britain. Consequently, 
international criminal jurisdiction cannot be applied. In this case human rights violations that con-
stitute war crimes or crimes against humanity can be prosecuted only by national courts. One very 
important aspect of criminal jurisdiction should be mentioned in this case, which is the principle of 
universality. Most crimes which stay under the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals are 
recognized as international crimes and punished on the principle of universality, established as such 
on the basis of several international agreements. They were also incorporated to national criminal 
codes which provide national courts competences in regard to these crimes. 
Practical difficulty is connected with national aspect and the ability of national courts 
to establish criminal procedure. In many situations, especially with a participation of high rank 
officials, national courts were limited by exclusion of ordinary courts to take legal steps. In some 
other cases national courts were unable or unwilling to start criminal proceedings. We also have to 
remember that jurisdiction of the ICC is complementary to national courts and can be established 
if the ICC, after preliminary legal, steps decides that a national court was unwilling, unable or the 
gravity of the crime justifies engagement of international criminal jurisdiction. That condition in 
practice limits applicability of international criminal law for human rights violations. 
In practice personnel of private security companies should be prosecuted by national 
courts. International jurisdiction is engaged when national judgment is final and not satisfactory. 
In such a situation a case may be brought into international level. As Lanzerini and Francioni (2011) 
rightly highlight: 
As for individual responsibility, there is no doubt that private military and securi-
ty companies employees are to be considered responsible in their personal capaci-
ty for any act reaching the threshold of a war crime or a crime against humanity 
(including for example, torture, rape, enslavement, etc.), and may thus be subject, 
inter alia, to the application of the principle of the universality of jurisdiction as 
well as – for the acts perpetrated in its personal and territorial scope of applica-
tion – to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (p. 55). 
Of course we have to take into consideration different regional systems of human rights 
protection, which work in a different way in Europe than in Latin America. But there is one common 
denominator between them – the principle of complementarity, which involves international system 
only in situations when national courts and judicial institutions are not able to protect human rights 
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properly. Unfortunately, we are not able to indicate many cases from international human rights tri-
bunals’ jurisdiction. The case of Blackwater was judged by a national court and mainly with regard 
to individual responsibility of the personnel. In this short essay we are able only to indicate the most 
important aspects of the responsibility of private military and security companies, with regard to 
human rights violations and serious violations of international humanitarian law applicable in armed 
conflicts. Another point which has to be raised refers to command criminal responsibility. This idea 
is based on criminal responsibility of legal persons, but unfortunately not recognized by all national 
criminal laws systems. This refers to a special way of thinking that a legal person or legal entity and 
consequently their organs, should be punished for violations of laws including human rights. 
Specificity of private military and security industry refers to self-regulations, too. They 
are based on soft-law mechanisms such as International Code of Conduct for Private Security Ser-
vice Providers and its Association which examine all members’ relation and observance of human 
rights (Huskey, & Sullivan, 2012, pp. 378-379; Shah, 2014). Of course the weakest point of this 
system is its voluntary nature and a lack of binding effect. It is worth to citing MacLeod (2011), 
who wrote that: 
Regulation of private military and security companies should take the form of 
a top-down-bottom-up hybrid approach which mirrors some of the existing in-
ternational business and human rights/corporate social responsibility initiatives. 
A hybrid approach can harness the benefits of international standards together 
with national implementation. The approach should be multistakeholder in na-
ture, ensuring both accountability and transparency. Most importantly it should 
be victim-centered and act as a deterrent to human rights violations by business, 
as well as providing an effective, transparent, and enforceable remedy for those 
who suffer as a result of such violations. Existing business and human rights proj-
ects meet some but crucially not all of these criteria. As it stands, private military 
and security companies do fall within the scope of the international business 
and human rights initiatives . . . but given their voluntary nature and lack of en-
forcement mechanisms, there is not enough to ensure proper accountability for 
human rights violations (p. 361). 
Conclusions
The growing phenomenon of private military and security companies has become a chal-
lenge for international law and national legal systems. There are many situations in which this 
phenomenon interacts with human rights and international humanitarian law. This short essay 
has been focused on introducing this problem, and cannot provide a detailed description of a pos-
sible solution. One of the most important elements of the discussion in international community 
should focus on binding international instrument, preferably a convention, which would be able to 
establish at least very elementary rules for states and international organizations, responsible for 
using private military and security companies (White, 2011; Karska, & Karski, 2014, p. 403). Under 
this condition human rights have a chance to be better protected, and impunity for human rights 
violations could be at least limited. The international community has witnessed a lot of initiatives 
from non-governmental entities, also model laws and self-regulations of the private security indus-
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try, but still the real problem has not even been reduced. The number of human rights violations has 
grown. Transnational nature, difficulties with human rights enforcement mechanisms, especially 
with access of victims to remedies, still wait for a much better solution.
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